Winners Must Pay for Losers--In his testimony in the Buchwald v Paramount case, studio executive Ned Tanen stated that "[i]f one screenplay out of fifteen or eighteen is ever made into a movie, it's par for the course at a major company . . . It's basically a development business and most of the projects you develop do not get made . . . Winners (pay) . . . for losers . . . That was how it had to be in such a risky, speculative and incredibly expensive business. If the studios didn't take the biggest chunk of change from (the blockbusters) . . . other movies might not get developed at all." Thus, Paramount " . . . tried to support its view that producing films is a risky venture, which requires that winners subsidize losers . . . " As evidence, the studio presented " . . . the court with the following limited information: of the ninety films released between 1978 and 1982, only thirty-four were profitable for Paramount and five of these contributed to more than fifty percent of the profits earned on all of the successful pictures during that period . . . " As noted above, the studio eventually dropped this argument, " . . . presumably because Paramount did not want to . . . allow a court-appointed accounting expert to examine its books and records."

As Adam Marcus reports that, " . . . the principal rationale underlying the motion picture industry's accounting system (is) . . . that most films are financial failures and that as a result, the successes must compensate for the failures." Producer Art Linson agrees, saying that "[f]ewer than one out of ten movies really make significant money and are perceived as hits. Fewer than one out of twenty are perceived as good movies." And as Mel Sattler explains the theory, "[t]he main rationale offered by Paramount (in the Buchwald case) for the standard net profit contract is what Sattler referred to as the 'fundamental economic underpinning' of the motion picture business: 'a studio must recoup not only its investment in a successful motion picture, but also sufficient additional revenues therefrom to cover the studio's unrecouped investment on its unsuccessful motion pictures, its ongoing development program, its distribution organization, and to finance its slate of future motion pictures.'"

This "fundamental economic underpinning" of the motion picture business is a fraud because the films that are being taken from in many instances are independently produced films, the reported distributor expenses are hopelessly inflated, the distributor utilizes hundreds of business practices (as set forth above and in The Feature Film Distribution Deal ) to shift monies from the revenue streams of independent films to the revenue streams of its own product, etc. In addition, as O'Donnell and McDougal point out, Paramount and other studios have substantially reduced their financial risk in movie-making by means of off balance sheet financing, co-financing and other programs by which outside investors contribute some or all of the money for producing and/or distributing the films.

Paramount actually defended itself in the Buchwald lawsuit by saying " . . . the contract was clear and unambiguous and (talent) . . . knew exactly what they were getting when the signed on the dotted line . . . Movies are a risky business . . . 'winners must pay for losers.' If blockbusters did not subsidize the many money-losing movies studios made, the movie industry would not survive." Now there's a familiar argument: " . . . the movie industry would not survive . . . " Again, the major studios are saying that if you don't let us keep our books in our usual and customary manner, which allows us to take money from the revenue streams of some movies and transfer it to other movies, the entire industry will not survive. Again, it is not a question of whether the industry will survive, but what entities within the industry will survive and at who's expense. Paramount, on behalf of all of the major studio/distributors was really saying that it would be much more difficult for the major studio/distributors to make as much money as they have been making (so they could continue to pay the exorbitant executive and talent compensation, along with the political contributions that keep the investigators away) if the court does not allow them to continue handling their accounting in their own unique way (i.e, making the winners pay for the losers). As stated earlier, in the event any or all of the major studios failed tomorrow, they would immediately be replaced by independent producers and distributors. In the meantime, it continues to be blatantly false to suggest that the " . . . movie industry would not survive."

In addition, Prindle actually comes back to question his own conclusion asking, "If Hollywood entertainment is such a risky business, how do so many firms manage to prosper for so long?" He then points out that " . . . Universal has been functioning, in one corporate form or another, since 1909; Paramount, since 1912; and Warner Brothers, since 1918 . . . " The short answer (Prindle suggests) . . . is . . . They deal in bulk . . . The long-term gamblers in the industry thus hedge their bets by spreading the action (spreading the risk)." The real answer this book suggests is that the business is not that risky for a few of the top firms, that have regularly engaged in unfair, unethical, anti-competitive, predatory and even illegal business practices. In other words, much of the money the major studio/distributors take from their so-called "winners" actually should be paid to someone else, and in many instances, the "losers" would not be financial losers at all if it were not for the routine manipulation of financial results associated with such films.

While producer Don Simpson was at Paramount he reports that the studio " . . . made thirty-seven profitable movies in a row. 'The truth is (says Simpson) that with ancillary sales . . . very few pictures lose money . . . Most break even. If you're making a picture forbetween seven and ten [million dollars], you don't lose money. The studio can't lose. I've been at Paramount for eleven years, and I can only remember two pictures losing money . . . We always got our money back. [even on] Reds, the budget of which I can't reveal [reportedly more than $35 million], we got our money back before the picture opened. Absolutely. People don't understand how this business works. You go out and get guarantees . . . [The misconceptions] are all publicity shit . . . [The studios] try to make Time and Newsweek believe in the poor beleaguered movie business." The great Hollywood PR machine is at it again!

As Peter Bart states, "[i]f a serious economist every tried to analyze the arcane ways of Hollywood, a nervous breakdown might quickly overtake him. Examine the inverse relationship between profitability and capital investment, for example. In the 'real world', new investment tends to decline in response to shrinking margins. In Hollywood, on the other hand, when times get tough, new investors always seem to rush into the fray . . . " What this really means, is that some of the people coming into the industry at the highest levels, like Edgar Bronfman and Sumner Redstone, know that the numbers the industry presents to government regulators and the public simply do not accurately reflect the real profitability of the film business. In other situations, it means that Hollywood has gone out into the market and misled outside investors into thinking it is ok to invest in the film business.

The Distributor Takes All The Risk--According to Joseph Phillips and others in the industry, "[t]he distributor, usually a major film company, is typically the one who takes the risk." He goes on to state that "[a]lthough the distributor often tries to spread the risk by bringing in outside investors who underwrite a share of the costs and who participate in any profits, it is the financial backing and the agreement to distribute the finished film by the major film company which is crucial."

Attorney Mark Litwak also echoes this distributor argument, saying that "[d]efenders of the major studios point out that the studios bear all the financial risks of making movies and therefore deserve the lion's share of revenues." The operative word here is "share". After all, profit participation auditors report that the major studios typically only share revenues in about 5% of the cases.

Both the Phillips and the Litwak statements above are overlooking some very fundamental aspects of film finance and its associated risk (1) independent producers and their financiers often assume the financial risks associated with acquisition, development and production costs on film projects, many of which are eventually distributed by the major studio/distributors, who only have their distribution costs at risk; (2) in a few situations each year, the independent producers and their financiers, actually assume some or all of the additional financial risk of covering the distribution expenses; and (3) in many instances, the major studio/distributors spread their risk by bringing in other financial partners on specific film projects. In any case, there are few films on which the major studio/distributors take all of the risk, financial or otherwise.

Too Much Financial Leverage Caused Most Film Company Failures--Some industry observers point out that the extensive use of financial leverage was not part of the business culture prior to the 1970's and suggest that most failures of feature film production companies are associated with excessive use of financial leverage. Financial leverage, is a term which refers to the amount of debt a company has in relation to its equity. The more long-term debt the company has, the greater the financial leverage. Such analysts point to improper financial management (e.g., increasing debt during good times, rather than decreasing debt) as one of several related reasons for such failures. Other reasons cited include the failure to use sophisticated computerized financial modeling on a continuous basis and the abandonment of successful actions (while substituting new, untried ideas, without first piloting them with limited financial commitments).

In contrast, this book suggests that improper financial management may be somewhat irrelevant (or at least, not the more important problem) in an industry that is so dominated by a few major players who have long-standing reputations for engaging in numerous questionable business practices. In other words, this book is suggesting that there are other reasons for the demise of such companies and that the author who suggested that financial leverage was the primary cause of those company failures was actually hoping to generate business for his financial consulting practice, and therefore his analysis of the causes of those film company failures was clouded with self-interest, just as many other transactions in the film industry are.

Their Movies Were Just No Good--The film industry also likes to perpetuate the myth that the single most important reason for company failures in the film industry is that the choices made by failed film companies with respect to the movies they chose to develop, produce or distribute were not good choices, that is the films were not well received by the movie-going public. Such a misleading argument overlooks all of the rest of the questions about the way the major studio/distributors conduct their business that are raised in this book (and its companion volume The Feature Film Distribution Deal), including the so-called theatrical squeeze, the settlement transaction and home video royalties (see related discussions herein).

Well Known People Know What They Are Doing--Name dropping means including the names of very important people in a conversation or other communication for the purpose of impressing the person receiving the communication. The name dropping tactic is not only used in social conversations but in business conversation including the presentation of film industry seminars, book promotion and, of course, in film publicity. Some financial analysts also suggest the tactic was successfully used by the large public feature film limited partnership offerings in recent years which raised monies for films produced and distributed by some of the major studio/distributors with well-known stars (Star Partners with MGM/UA and Silver Screen by Disney). Investors appeared to be more willing to invest in such vehicles even though the performance record of such large major-studio offerings has been consistently dismal from an investment perspective. The disappointing performance of such film partnerships from the investor perspective has also contributed to the perception that feature film limited partnerships, generally, are not useful financing vehicles for motion pictures. The truth is that the actual final financing vehicle generally has little to do with the financial results, for outside investors. Distributor business practices, on the other hand, have a great deal to do with those results, and those distributor practices do not change regardless of which financing vehicle is used to raise production funds.

There Are No Rules--One of the most commonly held myths among some populations within the Hollywood community, is a myth often repeated by so-called industry insiders in speeches, lectures and seminars (i.e., "There are no rules."). This belief probably started out as a positive expression that newcomers to the industry should not be held back by conventions relating to creative endeavors. It has (as evidenced by the distributor practices related in these books), been perverted by some to mean that the Hollywood community is different from all other "commercial worlds" and the usual rules do not apply. As an example, screenwriter, author William Goldman repeats the myth, saying, " . . . there are no rules." But we can at least assume he is talking about writing scripts. Unfortunately, he goes on to say that "[t]here are no concrete rules here any more than anyplace else in the movie business." Also, Paul Rosenfield points out that Sylvester Stallone is a hero of the Hollywood insiders club " . . . because of Rocky . . . " In other words, according to Rosenfield, Stallone and Rocky " . . . reassures the club that it's okay to do anything to win."

Nicholas Kent also states in his book that "[t]here are no rules in Hollywood . . . " then goes on to explain that " . . . because (movie people) . . . are 'artists', it seems they tend to consider themselves immune from the bounds that restrain other people. They live in a world apart, subject to their own laws, their own sense of right and wrong." If that is the case, then Hollywood would be a great place to be an investigator for the IRS, the U.S. Justice Department, the FTC, the local District Attorney, the Wall Street Journal or the trade press, if you were authorized to go after the famous and powerful.

Fine Line Features president Ira Deutchman offers the statement that "[t]he movie business is a business where there are no rules . . . " then actually contradicts himself by saying that " . . . the minute you think you've learned the rules, they change on you . . . " In David McClintick's book the following exchange re Hollywood is related: "It's as if Watergate never happened out here," Berte Hirschfield (wife of Alan Hirschfield) is reported to have said to David

Geffen, "It's as if this town (Hollywood) were an island that doesn't have to live by the rules of civilized society." "It isn't an island, but it is a very seductive community which changes the perceptions of many people who live here . . . " Geffen reportedly replied.

During a " . . . day-long symposium on sexual harassment in the workplace held at the Directors Guild . . . " on October 31, 1993, Sony Pictures Entertainment labor counsel Jennifer A. Rubin stated that "Hollywood is not exempt from the laws that everyone else lives by and is one of the worst offenders . . . " On the other hand, Peter Bart reported as recently as September 1994, that in " . . . some cases, to be sure, companies simply ignore the contracts and invent their own rules."

The people who are making the statement "[t]here are no rules" or some reasonable facsimile, may in reality be saying, "[w]e know there are rules, but we are not going to abide by them because we know that no one who wants to stay in the film business will complain and even if they do, their remedies are woefully inadequate." In other words, "[w]e don't abide by the rules, because we have been able to get away with it for years and continue to do so today." At some point, this part of the Hollywood community needs to be reminded that the anti-trust laws, securities laws, tax laws, employment discrimination laws, contract provisions and criminal laws still apply to their conduct.

Film Schools Would Not Offer the Courses if There Were No Need--There are a large number of colleges and universities in the U.S. offering courses or degree programs in film. Some of the better known film schools include New York University, the University of Southern California and the University of California at Los Angeles. The American Film magazine reported a few years ago that these film-study programs across the U.S. graduate some 26,000 students each year, but that only 5% to 10% of those graduates actually end up making a living in their chosen field. Is it possible that both the industry and the film schools are actively misrepresenting the promise of career opportunities in the film industry; that they are misleading some 23,400 individuals annually and persuading them to pretty much waste their undergraduate studies on subjects which are not likely to be of much value in their lives? And does anyone recognize that the film industry actually has a self-serving reason for actively or passively encouraging this fraud on unsuspecting students? After all, a significant number of people entering the film industry for the first year wind up having to work as interns for little or no pay just to get some experience, and such a system is merely a clever variation on slavery.

As David Prindle, a college level government instructor, points out, " . . . the director who yearns to create a cinematic masterpiece may work for years, or even for an entire career, shooting insurance commercials or daytime soap operas. But this well-known fact does not discourage ever-increasing numbers of students from enrolling in directing classes atuniversities." On the other hand, if this "fact" is so well-known, it would seem that the colleges and universities themselves (and/or the industry) should take the responsible step and refuse to allow so many young, immature and unsophisticated students from making the mistake of studying and training for a career they are not likely to have.

Acting Opportunities Abound--Prindle also reports that "[i]n most industries, the supply of workers adjusts over time to the number of available jobs . . . In the language of economists, labor markets tend toward equilibrium. Not so in Hollywood. Since the 1920s, hordes of people have converged on Los Angeles, attracted both by the hope of realizing themselves in cinematic expression and by the possibility of striking it rich . . . " Prindle goes on to report that "[t]he official unemployment rate among members of the Screen Actors Guild is about 85 percent (that figure does not even count the ambitious amateurs who have not been able to acquire a union card) . . . the industry does not conform to rational economic models of how labor markets work, but is in permanent disequilibrium."

There is No Racial Discrimination in Script Selection--Herb Steinberg, spokesman for the major studios is quoted by Prindle as saying, " . . . that the authors of scripts are usually identified to readers only by the name on the cover . . . if an executive or producer picks a script written by a white male, it is because, without being identified as such, the white male did the best job." Unfortunately, Herb Steinberg is not telling us the whole truth with regard to script selection, after all, studio readers do not select the scripts that are going to be developed, and certainly do not select the scripts to be produced into movies. Readers merely perform a very preliminary screening service by reading and reporting on the thousands of script submissions, so the studio executives will not be burdened with the responsibility of reading such an overwhelming number of scripts. Thus, the studio executives, only read those scripts that appear to be the most favored by the readers or those that are recommended by known and trusted sources (agents, attorneys, etc.).

Also, there are no available statistics on which sources initiate the most actual productions. In addition, if a script looks promising, someone within Hollywood's inner circle has to have a meeting with the script writer and/or his or her agent to talk terms, development possibilities and to determine whether the script writer will be involved in future writing on the project. In any case, by the time and before a script is actually selected for development or production, you can be certain that the full identity of the scriptwriter is known to the studio executive recommending the choice in the vast majority of the cases. Thus, Steinberg's representation above is disingenuous, at best. It is fair then to ask the question, why would Herb Steinberg make such a misleading statement? Based on the research on the industry underlying this series of books, the probable answer is that most of the scripts actually produced are written or co-written by the family, friends or associates of the Hollywood insiders who have an interest in misleading the public about the fairness of the system.

The Film Industry Operates in a Free Market--Film industry insiders commonly suggest that business in Hollywood is conducted in accordance with long established free market principles, (i.e., free market forces are primarily responsible for prices, availability, etc). As Professor Noam Chomsky, points out however, (in reference to the general U.S. economy) " . . . talk about a free market at this point is something of a joke . . . " Chomsky goes on to say that " . . . one alternative to the free market system is the one we already have, because we often don't rely on the market where powerful interests would be damaged. Our actual economic policy is a mixture of protectionist, interventionist, free market and liberal measures. And it's directed primarily to the needs of those who implement social policy, who are mostly the wealthy and the powerful." The same is true of the U.S. film industry (i.e., talk of a free market at this point is " . . . something of a joke . . . ").

In its own brochure, the MPAA talks about wanting a free market: "The MPAA/MPEAA wants nothing more than a free, open and fair marketplace where our stories on film and tape can compete honestly with all others." And specifically with respect to foreign trade, MPAA hired gun Jack Valenti makes the specious argument that all " . . . the U.S. film industry asks is to have the same freedom of movement in other countries that foreign businessmen find so alluring and seductive in ours." Both of these references are actually directed toward keeping markets free in foreign territories, so that U.S. film and video product will not be prevented from taking over the local market to the exclusion of locally produced films and videos. The statement does not apply to the domestic marketplace, where the power and dominance of the major studio/distributors has never been effectively challenged in the 80 plus year reign of the Hollywood majors. Thus, what Jack Valenti is really saying is that the MPAA does not want a free market in the domestic marketplace, it merely wants an opportunity to dominate the foreign territories just as it does in the U.S.

A true free enterprise system is an economy structured around unfettered choice, (i.e., businesses are free to choose what products they will make, consumers are free to choose what they will buy and prices are generally left to fluctuate with supply and demand in an openly competitive market). Free enterprise has traditionally been one of the basic underlying economic principles of the U.S. economy. Unfortunately, it has long been established that businesses with the power to do so, if not limited by government, will use predatory practices, unfair business practices, anti-competitive practices, unethical practices, etc. to gain a competitive edge over some competitors, often to the detriment of the consuming public. These latter phrases appear to more accurately describe the U.S. film industry than "free enterprise".

A Paramount spokesman in the Buchwald v Paramount case admitted, for example, that "[w]e could do business any number of different ways. We could try to negotiate a better split with the theater owners and add more revenues. We could pay gross participants less. We could pay studio executives less. Shareholders could settle for less dividends." In addition, studio executives, stars, agents and the insider entertainment attorneys could accept less money for their services, agency and attorney packaging could be frowned upon as unethical (at least), distributors could demand that exhibitors settle pursuant to the terms of the original contract following a film's run, and so forth. But none of those things typically happen. Hollywood chooses to conduct its business the way it does, because it has the power to do so, and the great imbalance in power as between parties, in most instances removes the free choice characteristic of a free market.

We're Honest in Expressing Our Views of the Film Industry Critics--After Michael Medved's book came out in 1992, Time's Richard Corliss wrote: "[t]here's a lot to criticize in grimy popular culture, (but) critic Michael Medved is the wrong man for the job . . . Instead of just isolating a disturbing tendency in pop culture, he is compelled to document it with suspicious statistics, to draw conspiratorial conclusions, to call for a return in spirit to the movies' puritanical Production Code of the 1930s . . . " Peter Biskind, writing in Premiere magazine called Michael Medved's book Hollywood vs. America " . . . simplistic . . . repellent and ill-argued . . . " Variety's Peter Bart on Medved's book: " . . . the tome provides a chilling glimpse of what happens when a humorless, authoritarian mind is inundated by the noise of pop culture . . . .the book reads instead like a nervous breakdown set in type."

In defense of Medved, he did not suggest a conspiracy, nor did he " . . . call for a return in spirit to the movies' puritanical Production Code of the 1930s . . . " Such misstatements of the truth appeared regularly in the Hollywood trade press following the publication of Medved's book, and appear to be just another example of how mean-spirited, dishonest and malicious the Hollywood insiders' counter-attacks can be. The well-orchestrated attack on Medved's credibility is typical of the way Hollywood treats outsiders, or, in Medved's case, a fellow Jewish male who happens to be very religious, and who also recognizes much of what is wrong with Hollywood.

Medved also had to defend himself in March of 1992 " . . . against colleagues' criticism that his objectivity has been compromised by his acknowledged relationships with Hollywood studios." Medved had apparently done " . . . script work for two film studios . . . " although he said " . . . he hadn't been paid for those services since becoming a critic in 1985." He also " . . . accepted $8,000 to $10,000 to be an expert witness for Paramount Pictures in the studio's defense of columnist Art Buchwald's Coming to America lawsuit." Los Angeles critic and president of the National Society of Film Critics, Peter Rainer said, "[i]f you're being paid as an expert adviser in a case involving a studio, it places you in a conflict-of-interest limbo that no critic wants to find himself in." On the other hand, if Hollywood tried to apply a rule prohibiting conflicts-of- interest across the board, most of the activities of the Hollywood insiders will be shut down immediately. It is hardly fair to criticize Medved for a minor and rather insignificant example of behavior (a minor conflict-of-interest) that is an essential part of everyday business in Hollywood at an even more serious level.

Hollywood will typically try to characterize its critics as part of a "political fringe" on the far right and that the real motives behind such attacks are efforts to gain publicity for and advance the careers of such critics. As an example, in a full page ad in the Daily Variety, November 23, 1993, the liberal Hollywood group The Center For the Study of Popular Culture said "Hollywood is no stranger to attacks that characterize it as an enemy of the republic. The political fringe has always found us a useful target of opportunity from which to nurture demagogic careers or to distract their constituency from the real problems that surround society." Note here, of course, that this Hollywood group is laying the groundwork for suggesting that many of Hollywood's critics come from the "political fringe".

We Don't Exaggerate the Arguments of Our Critics--The film industry apologists who want to distract the "film industry critics" in their criticism relating to who really controls Hollywood often resort to the old "straw man" argument by exaggerating the claims being made by the industry critics. The defenders of Hollywood thus suggest that the critics are really alleging that some sort of "cabal" exists or that a "conspiracy" exists, not because that is what the industry critics are actually saying, but that such exaggerations place a much higher burden of proof or persuasion on the critics and serves to divert the focus of the discussion. In other words, it is much more difficult for the industry critics to prove or show persuasive evidence that a "Jewish cabal" or any other cabal exists in Hollywood or that a "Hollywood insiders conspiracy" or any other form of conspiracy exists in Hollywood, so the defenders of Hollywood like to misrepresent the industry critics' arguments precisely for that reason.

Again, when Michael Medved came out with his book Hollywood vs America, the industry retaliated by attacking his credibility and misstating the arguments he made. In an article in Los Angeles magazine, Michael Logan answered some of those misstatements, pointing that "Medved . . . does not advocate censorship, calling it 'a very stupid answer to a very serious problem.' He does not claim media messages cause destructive behavior but feels they encourage it. He does not suggest that the entertainment industry is single-handedly responsible for America's ills but that it exacerbates and contributes to them." The above Michael Logan statements were all made in answer to Hollywood insider misinformation and exaggeration put out in response to Medved's criticism of the industry.

Hollywood also tends to exaggerate and misstate the claims of its opponents. For example, the ad goes on to state that " . . . Senator Paul Simon and Attorney General Janet Reno have decided to focus on television and motion pictures as the root cause of this decay of common virtues that is destroying our own present and our children's future . . . " In truth, neither Simon or Reno claim that media violence is the "root cause" of societal decay, only that it is a significant contributing factor.

The Hollywood liberals also tend to exaggerate the remedies proposed by industry critics, suggesting that it " . . . is only a matter of time before they conclude we must also be instructed in what we can say." The remedy of the Hollywood liberals " . . . is not less free speech--it is more. McCarthyism taught us that the consequences of silencing a single voice are far worse than allowing that voice to be heard . . . we must reaffirm our dedication to the unambiguous language of the First Amendment, lest we be forced to relive the tyranny of the blacklist years." In other words, an effort is being made here to characterize those who would criticize the film industry as "McCarthyites". And, even though the film industry critics are not advocating censorship, these Hollywood liberals want the readers of its ads to believe that is what is being proposed. Such misleading tactics are patently dishonest.

The Movie Industry is Different--The Hollywood insiders and those who choose to publish their views, like to rationalize by saying the " . . . movie industry defies strict analysis from a traditional business point of view. Any profiling of its points to certain concepts not characteristic of other industries, concepts that can prevail only in an industry whose product is creative." This is another aspect of the Hollywood insider line, pure and simple. Those major studio/distributor entities that have controlled and dominated the U.S. motion picture industry for three generations want the rest of the world to believe that traditional business analysis (whatever it is) will not adequately explain the operations of the film business. They also want us to believe that traditional accounting principles cannot be applied to this industry. Both of these statements appear to this author to be nothing more than rationalization put forth in an effort to justify the continuing control of the motion picture industry in the hands of a few.

American Movies Are Better--Entertainment attorney Lee Steiner is quoted in Goldberg's book as saying: "American movies have strong international appeal because the production quality is generally higher than movies made abroad . . . " Is this a true statement? How can anyone objectively compare and judge the "production quality" of movies competing in the foreign marketplace? How can anyone, including attorney Lee Steiner be in a position to say why people in foreign countries go to see American movies more than films from other places? Is it possible that Steiner is overlooking the fact that people go to see movies that are conveniently available to be seen? Thus, if most of the movies on the screens around the world are American,it does not really matter that their production quality is higher, if it is. And if American distributors in foreign countries are still using block booking, there is no question that some of those American movies, that are drawing larger audiences than the film product of other countries, are in fact poorer quality movies in every respect. In addition, if the unfair, unethical, anti-competitive, predatory and illegal business practices of the American major studio/distributors are the real underlying reasons why foreign filmmakers do not have greater success in the marketplace, then that directly affects the amount of money that is available for those filmmakers to produce their next film, thus effectively reducing their ability to put more "quality" on the screen. Thus, Steiner's analysis is overly simplistic at best.